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Abstract
The integrated information theory (IIT) is a promising theory of consciousness. However,
there are several problems with IIT’s axioms and postulates. Moreover, IIT entails that some
two-dimensional grids of identical logic gates have more consciousness than humans. Many
have found this prediction to be implausible, and as will be argued here, this prediction also
exacerbates the so-called “hard problem of consciousness”. Recently, it has been argued
that if we treat the phenomenological aspects of consciousness as an illusion (illusionism),
we can avoid the hard problem altogether by replacing it with the more tractable illusion
problem: the problem of explaining how introspection systematically misrepresents expe-
riences as having phenomenology. IIT is intended to be a theory of the phenomenological
aspects of consciousness. However, it is possible to reformulate the axioms and postulates
of IIT consistently with illusionism. Here it is argued that the resulting theory - illusionist
integrated information theory - removes several problems for IIT including the hard problem
and the logic gate problem, and also enables meaningful progress for illusionists on solving
the illusion problem.
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1 Introduction
Neurophysiological and computational modeling provides excellent tools for specifying mecha-
nisms that perform cognitive functions. These models can potentially explain cognitive func-
tions relevant to consciousness, such as awareness, memory, reportability, and so on. However,
Chalmers (1995, 1996) has argued that these tools are insufficient to explain the phenomenological
aspects of consciousness. He argues that even if all cognitive functions relevant to consciousness
are explained, we would still be left with the question of why the performance of these functions
is accompanied by phenomenology. These phenomenological aspects of consciousness are not
defined in terms of cognitive functions, but instead in terms of what it is like to experience them.
A state is said to exhibit phenomenal consciousness if and only if there is something it is like to
be in that state (Nagel, 1974). For Chalmers, the problem of finding mechanistic explanations
of cognitive functions are the “easy” problems of consciousness, while the problem of explaining
phenomenal consciousness is the “hard” problem of consciousness. The hard problem poses a
serious problem for the development of a complete theory of consciousness. It also poses a deep
philosophical puzzle concerning the relationship between our minds and the physical universe.
The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) was formulated by Tononi (2004,
2008) and has been advanced by a number of researchers over the last decade. IIT is explicitly a
theory of phenomenal consciousness, but also provides an operational definition of phenomenal
consciousness: it is that property that you lose when you fall into dreamless sleep and regain
when you either start dreaming or wake up (Tononi et. al. 2016: p450). This is intended to
include a variety of experiences including sense perceptions, moods and emotions, dream states,
mental images, and so on.
In terms of precision, IIT is revolutionary. It is the first theory of consciousness to offer
a measure of consciousness that is both empirically defensible and potentially applicable to
any possible physical system.1 IIT defines Φ, which is a measure of the amount of integrated
information in a physical system. Integrated information is a certain type of interconnectivity
among entities (e.g. neurons) that is apparently present in conscious regions of the brain but
absent in unconscious regions.
However, despite the outstanding precision of this theory and its burgeoning empirical appli-
cations (e.g. Tsuchiya et. al. (2017) and Haun et. al. (2016)), IIT faces a number of problems.
Firstly, there are problems with IIT’s axioms and postulates, to be explained in the next section.
Secondly, IIT entails that a simple 2D grid of identical logic gates can have greater consciousness
than a human (Tononi, 2004). Many find this prediction implausible. Thirdly, IIT does not
make progress on the hard problem. It may well be that integrated information is the correlate
of phenomenal consciousness in the sense that whenever there is phenomenal consciousness there
is integrated information. But a correlation is not an explanation, it is something that stands in
need of explanation. Why is integrated information accompanied by phenomenal consciousness?
While the hard problem is an apparent problem for any neuroscientific theory of consciousness,
it is argued in section 3 that IIT’s prediction of conscious 2D grids exacerbates the hard problem
by blocking standard responses to it.
Recently, it has been argued by Frankish (2016a, 2016b) that if we treat phenomenal con-
sciousness as an illusion, then we eliminate the question of why any system would be accompanied
by phenomenal consciousness, thereby removing the hard problem. This still leaves a residual
problem behind, the problem of explaining how introspection systematically misrepresents expe-
riences as having phenomenology. Frankish calls this the illusion problem and argues that it is
much more tractable than the hard problem.
On the face of it, IIT is a theory of phenomenal consciousness that is deeply at odds with
1Fully generalized integrated information measures are still being developed, e.g. Tegmark (2016).
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illusionism. However, it is possible to reformulate the axioms and postulates of IIT, consistently
with illusionism. I call this reformulation illusionist integrated information theory. I argue that
illusionist-IIT removes several problems that plague IIT, including the hard problem and the
logic gate problem.
In addition, I argue that illusionist-IIT helps solve problems for illusionism too. Firstly, the
empirical support for IIT is growing. For example, it has recently been claimed that it is possible
to predict a subject’s experience just by considering the patterns of integrated information in
the subject’s brain.2 If there is an empirical case for integrated information being the physical
correlate of phenomenal consciousness, then there is a corresponding puzzle for illusionism: if
phenomenal consciousness does not exist, then why does it appear to have a stable physical
correlate in the brain? As we shall see, illusionist-IIT has a built in solution to this puzzle.
Secondly, I will argue that illusionist-IIT enables progress on the illusion problem. Frankish
(2016) tries to explain the illusion by appeal to phenomenal concepts. The idea is that introspec-
tion systematically represents experiences in terms of defective phenomenal concepts. However,
it is unclear what the content of these concepts are, and how we could have acquired them. It is
argued that we can better understand phenomenal concepts if we treat them as partially veridi-
cal such that their veridical content is integrated information in the brain. In section 7 I argue
that this enables progress on the illusion problem by making it easier to see why the illusion
problem is an “easy” problem of consciousness and by creating avenues for empirical research on
the mechanisms underlying the introspective illusion.
In the next section I explain IIT. Section 3 then explains the hard problem, the logic gate
problem, and why the latter problem exacerbates the former. Section 4 introduces illusionism
and explains how it replaces the hard problem with the illusion problem. Section 5 reformulates
IIT into illusionist-IIT. Section 6 formulates seven distinct problems for IIT and argues that
illusionist-IIT resolves them. Finally, section 7 argues that illusionist-IIT makes progress on
solving the illusion problem.
2 Integrated information theory
IIT assumes that introspection gives accurate knowledge of phenomenology3. In fact introspec-
tion is regarded as so accurate, that IIT relies on it to formulate the basic axioms from which
IIT’s physical postulates are derived. IIT has five axioms. These axioms are intended to be
self-evident facts about consciousness that can be verified simply by introspecting one’s own
conscious experiences. In what follows consciousness always means phenomenal consciousness.4
Intrinsic Existence Axiom: consciousness exists as an intrinsic property, that is,
my experience exists independently of external stimulus, as illustrated by hallucina-
tions of external stimuli. Moreover, a conscious subject cannot doubt one’s ongoing
experiences, which are private and immediately known.
Composition Axiom: consciousness is structured in that each experience is com-
posed of many phenomenological distinctions. For example, an experience of a blue
book may be broken down into an experience of blue, an experience of a rectangle,
etc.
2See Tsuchiya et. al. (2017) and Haun et. al. (2016). However, the empirical case for IIT should not be
overstated, and has been challenged e.g. in Barrett & Seth (2011), Peressini (2013), and Cerullo (2015: pp.4-5).
3“As recognized by Descartes, my own experience is the only thing whose existence is immediately and abso-
lutely evident” (Tononi et. al. 2016: p451).
4The following list is based on Tononi and Koch (2016) and Tononi et. al. (2016).
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Information Axiom: each conscious experience is the particular way it is by dif-
ferentiating itself from what it is not. For example, an experience of a blue wall is
what it is in part because it is not an experience of a green wall, etc. The more an
experience rules out, the more information it contains.
Integration Axiom consciousness is unified in the sense that each experience is
not reducible to non-interdependent subsets of phenomenological distinctions. For
example, an experience of a blue book is not simply a colorless book-shape combined
with disembodied blue. These phenomenological distinctions are integrated into a
whole experience.
Exclusion Axiom: consciousness is definite in content and spatio-temporal grain:
each experience has the set of phenomenological distinctions it has, neither less nor
more, and it flows at the speed it flows, neither faster nor slower. For example,
my experience is never a superposition of a visual field with one boundary and an-
other visual field with a greater boundary. Nor does experience ever enter into a
superposition of flowing at distinct speeds.
Many critics have taken issue with these axioms.5 We can distinguish three types of problem
that can be raised for them. Firstly, some axioms do not seem sufficiently precise. Secondly, some
are sufficiently precise, but seem inaccurate. Thirdly, the axioms seem incomplete, or insufficient
for fully capturing phenomenal consciousness. These are serious problems which I will simply
flag now and address in section 6. For now, let us continue the exposition of IIT.
IIT now attempts to specify what properties a physical system must have in order to support
consciousness. For this, a corresponding set of physical postulates is formulated. To describe
these postulates, I will use a simple example that is based on the example in Tsuchiya (2017).6
The example is described in (a) Figure 1. and will be referenced to help explain the postulates.
Intrinsic Existence Postulate: to support consciousness, a physical system must
have intrinsic causal power. The system must have causal power over itself, inde-
pendently of external factors. At minimum, this requires that there are some future
states that the system can reach from some initial state with probability greater than
chance, just in virtue of its internal structure. AB (figure 1) satisfies this postulate
since its internal structure guarantees with certainty that it will reach state A=0;
B=1 from state A=1; B=0.
Composition Postulate: to support consciousness, a physical system must be
structured into parts that themselves have causal power within the system. Being
made of neurons A and B, system AB satisfies this postulate.
Information Postulate: to support consciousness, a physical system must specify a
causal structure that differentiates its state at one time from its state at other times.
AB satisfies this axiom since we can distinguish four possible present states (both
on; both off; A=1,B=0; A=0,B=1). It is possible to measure the extent to which the
system in a given state constrains its possible future states. For example, if AB is
in state A=1, B=0, then AB contains two units of information about its immediate
future state.
5For example Peressini (2013) and Cerullo (2015).
6For simplicity, I leave out some details that are inessential to the discussion. For example, I calculate the
integrated information a system has about its future state. But IIT also requires that we calculate the integrated
information the system has about its past state and take the minimum value. Furthermore, the mathematical
formalism has undergone significant evolution (from IIT 1.0 to IIT 3.0). The present discussion is based on IIT
2.0, which is sufficient for our purposes
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(a) Figure 1. Two connected neurons, A and
B. They can be either off (black=0) or on (white=1).
They function as copy gates such that (after some time
lag) they turn connected neurons into their current
state. The AB system has four possible initial states
and is depicted as being in the specific initial state
A=1, B=0. So given AB’s internal causal powers, the
next state will be A=0, B=1. We can say that when
AB is in state A=1, B=0, AB contains intrinsic in-
formation I(AB) about its later state, since it cuts
down four possible states into one. Logarithm base 2
gives units of information such that I(AB) = log2(4)
- log2(1) = 2. So AB has two units of intrinsic infor-
mation. This information is also integrated. For we
would lose it by ignoring (“cutting”) the connection
between A and B: A by itself gives zero information
about A’s next state. Same with B. So the integrated
information of AB, Φ(AB) = I(AB) - (I(A) + I(B)) =
(2 - (0 + 0)). AB therefore has two units of conscious-
ness.
A
B
C
D
copy copy
cut
cut
cut
(b) Figure 2. An idealized split brain patient.
AB is the left hemisphere, CD is the right hemisphere.
The connections between the two hemispheres have
been cut. From figure 1 we know that I(AB) = Φ(AB)
= I(CD) = Φ(CD) = 2. The exclusion postulate then
entails that the whole brain ABCD is only conscious if
Φ(ABCD) > 2. But Φ(ABCD) = I(ABCD) - (I(AB) +
I(CD)). That is, Φ(ABCD) = (4 - (2 + 2)) = 0. Hence,
the split brain is not conscious, the hemispheres are.
However, prior to the cuts, the exclusion postulate
would entail only one conscious mind since in that case
Φ(ABCD) > Φ(AB) and Φ(ABCD) > Φ(CD). This is
IIT’s explanation of split-brain cases.
Integration Postulate: to support consciousness, a physical system’s causal struc-
ture must be unified, or irreducible to a simple sum of component causal structures.
AB satisfies this axiom since it is the causal connections between A and B that con-
strain AB’s possible future states. Ignoring those connections, thereby treating A
and B as independent parts, prevents us from ruling out so many possible future
states for AB. The extent to which a system’s causal structure is irreducible in this
way is measured by its amount of integrated information or Φ. Since A (and also B)
carries zero information about its own future state, Φ(AB) = 2.
Exclusion Postulate: to support consciousness, the system’s causal structure must
be specified over a single set of elements, the set that yields the maximum amount of
integrated information. For example, although our AB system has nonzero Φ, there
are two situations in which it would exhibit zero consciousness. The first is if AB is
a component of a bigger system (call it ABX) which itself has Φ > 2. If ABX is a
closed system then although AB would contribute to ABX’s consciousness, AB would
not itself be conscious. Here we say that ABX has Φmax. The second situation is
when AB contains a part that has Φ > 2. If AB is a closed system then although
it has nonzero Φ, it would have no consciousness. Instead, its Φmax part would be
conscious.
A final aspect of the theory is the crucial distinction between the quantity of consciousness
(Φmax), and the quality of a conscious experience. The latter is specified by the informational
relationships generated by the conscious system (Balduzzi & Tononi (2009)). For any system
in a given state, one can in principle draw up its informational relationships in a space called
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“qualia-space”. Every possible experiential quality corresponds to a particular shape composed
of information relationships in this space. This is important for testing IIT. For in principle, one
would like to deduce the exact phenomenal quality of a subject’s experience from the informa-
tional shape determined by the subject’s brain state.
Above I mentioned three problems for the IIT axioms: unclarity, inaccuracy, and incomplete-
ness. There is a fourth problem for IIT, which concerns the connection between the axioms and
the postulates. Granting the correctness of the axioms, it is not clear whether the postulates are
even suggested by the axioms, let alone derivable from them. It will later be argued that all four
of these problems are removed if we adopt illusionist integrated information theory.
To conclude the exposition of IIT let us illustrate its potential predictive and explanatory
power using two examples. The first example concerns the fact that the unconscious cerebellum
has far more neurons than the conscious cerebrum. This fact suggests neuron number is not
relevant to consciousness whereas neuron interaction is. And indeed, cerebrum neurons are
highly integrated whereas cerebellum neurons are not. Probe a region of the cerebellum and
there is little disruption to the overall causal network of cerebellum neurons. But probe a region
of the cerebrum and there is significant disruption to the overall causal network of cerebrum
neurons. IIT can explain this by the fact that the cerebrum Φmax is much greater than the
cerebellum Φmax (Tononi & Koch 2015: p10).
The second illustration of IIT’s explanatory power concerns split-brain patients, and the fact
that splitting the two brain hemispheres can generate two conscious minds that are continuous
with the former unified mind. Any attempt to explain consciousness in terms of brain functions
must explain this. According to IIT, prior to the connections between the two hemispheres being
severed, both hemispheres have some Φ, but only the whole brain has Φmax. Meanwhile after
the connections are severed, the whole brain has less Φ than either of its hemispheres, and each
hemisphere enjoys its own Φmax. This is illustrated in (b) figure 2. The exclusion postulate
entails that if Φ(ABCD) < 2, then ABCD has no consciousness at all. Rather, AB and CD each
have their own conscious minds. This is how IIT explains split-brain patients (Tononi & Koch
2015: p10).7
IIT is a promising theory of consciousness. But it also faces significant problems. I have
already briefly mentioned four problems regarding the axioms and postulates. But perhaps the
deepest problem is the so-called hard problem of consciousness.
3 The hard problem of consciousness
The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of reductively explaining phenomenal con-
sciousness in terms of physical processes.
According to Chalmers (2012: pp.307-8), a successful reductive explanation will give just
enough detail to make it plausible that the explanandum is deducible from the explanans.8 If we
adopt this constraint for consciousness, then a successful reductive explanation of consciousness
must make it plausible that consciousness is deducible from a physical description of the relevant
features of conscious subjects. This is why Chalmers (1996) appeals to the logical possibility (or
“conceivability”) of zombies to argue that a reductive explanation of consciousness in physical
terms is impossible. A zombie is a physical duplicate of oneself that does not have phenomenal
7The “two-streams” model of the split-brain is assumed in IIT’s explanation. This model has been challenged
e.g. in Bayne (2007, 2008). Note that Bayne (2007: p9) nonetheless describes it as “the received view” of the
split-brain.
8McQueen (2015) argues that the success of reductive explanations in physics (specifically, reductive expla-
nations of macrophysical properties in terms of microphysical descriptions) depend in part on the fact that they
meet this constraint. See also Chalmers (2012: sec. 6.15).
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consciousness. If the physical description of oneself is consistent with the absence of conscious-
ness, then consciousness is not deducible from that physical description. But then no reductive
explanation of consciousness in physical terms can be successful.
For the purposes of this section I will adopt this explanatory constraint as it will help to show
why IIT exacerbates the hard problem. If IIT is to reductively explain consciousness, it must
make plausible the claim that consciousness is deducible from its physical descriptions, thereby
rendering zombies inconceivable. IIT’s physical descriptions are given by its physical postulates,
which describe the patterns of integrated information in conscious physical systems. IIT makes
the hard problem look worse since we apparently have all relevant information available to
completely describe the integrated information patterns of certain simple high-Φ systems, yet we
cannot deduce consciousness from those descriptions. Non-conscious duplicates of such systems
seem entirely conceivable. Let us consider some simple systems with nonzero Φ.
The cerebrum has much greater Φ than the cerebellum. But the cerebellum will still have
pockets of Φmax spikes and will therefore have pockets of consciousness. This is allowed by
the exclusion postulate. To see this, recall that the reason for why a split brain does not
have one unified conscious mind is that each hemisphere has greater Φ than their union, so
the consciousness of their union is excluded in favour of the consciousnesses of the hemispheres
((b) Figure 2 ). Arguably, the same thing is happening in the cerebellum, where pockets of
neural mechanisms in the cerebellum will have greater Φ than their union, thereby excluding
the consciousness of the cerebellum in favour of the consciousnesses of its components. We may
expand these considerations to isolated molecules, which may have some consciousness in virtue
of having nonzero Φ and being isolated from more complex systems. We can imagine a world that
contains nothing but one such molecule. It is hard to see how we could deduce consciousness from
the physical description of such a simple world. A “zombie-molecule” seems entirely conceivable.
In IIT, a system need not be as complex as a molecule to exhibit consciousness. Our simple
isolated AB-system ((a) Figure 1.) was calculated to possess two units of Φ and so two units of
consciousness. This is not nearly as much Φ as a human cerebrum (which, according to some
estimates, has Φ equal to one billion). But AB is still conscious to a degree according to IIT,
and it is rather difficult to see how we could deduce consciousness from AB’s physical description
alone. An “AB-zombie” is certainly conceivable.
Such examples were brought to their logical extreme when Scott Aaronson calculated that
certain very simple systems can be constructed so as to have much more Φ than human brains.
For example (Tononi, 2014), N XOR gates arranged in a grid would have Φmax =
√
N . If we
estimate the human cerebrum to have Φmax equal to one billion, then stacking one billion squared
XOR gates along a 2D grid would create a physical system with the same amount of consciousness
as a human. It is very puzzling as to how such a system could gain so much consciousness just
by adding more XOR gates to it. Moreover, a “grid zombie” is entirely conceivable: there is no
logical inconsistency in there being nothing it is like to be such a grid.
Such examples mean that the standard response to the hard problem is unavailable to IIT.
It is natural to respond that zombies may well be conceivable for us now, but that this is due
to our current ignorance of the underlying physical details of the brain.9 For example, Dennett
(1996) argues that there is no more of a “hard” problem of consciousness for us now than there
was a “hard” problem of life for seventeenth century vitalists. Likewise Block (2009: p1115),
following Nagel (1974), argues that our situation is analogous to that of pre-Socratic philosophers
who had no way of understanding how heat could be a kind of motion, because they lacked the
appropriate concepts of motion (e.g. kinetic energy) that would allow an understanding of how
9See e.g. van Gulick 2000. This is described as the standard response by Worley (2003) and Brueckner (2001),
and likely still is within the scientific community. Within more recent analytic philosophy of mind, it is possible
that the so-called phenomenal concepts strategy (Stoljar 2005) has become more popular.
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such different concepts could pick out the same phenomenon. The conscious grid blocks this
response, since there is no relevant underlying details of the grid that we are ignorant of. We can
fully understand why it generates such high Φ, but this full understanding hardly suggests that
grid-zombies are inconceivable. This is the sense in which IIT exacerbates the hard problem.
When considering the hard problem, Tononi and Koch (2015: p5) say this,
“Indeed, as long as one starts from the brain and asks how it could possibly give rise
to experience–in effect trying to ‘distill’ mind out of matter, the problem may be not
only hard, but almost impossible to solve. But things may be less hard if one takes
the opposite approach: start from consciousness itself, by identifying its essential
properties, and ask what kinds of physical mechanisms could possibly account for
them. This is the approach taken by [IIT]”.
Here we should distinguish the context in which we discover theories from the context in
which we justify theories [Schickore 2014: sec. 5]. I agree with Tononi and Koch that in the
context of trying to discover a theory of consciousness, we should ask what kinds of physical
mechanisms could account for consciousness. However, it is in the context of justification that
the theory must make it plausible that the explanandum is deducible from the explanans. By
IIT’s own lights, we already have an effectively complete physical description of a grid of identical
logic gates that has more Φmax than a human. So we are now looking to justify IIT with respect
to this example. The problem is that the absence of consciousness is entirely consistent with
IIT’s physical description of the grid.
To solve the hard problem we need to know exactly how consciousness is related to its physical
correlates in the brain. This involves engaging philosophical theories of consciousness that specify
the metaphysical relation binding consciousness to the physical world. Unfortunately, Tononi
and Koch’s remarks appear inconsistent on this matter. In some places they advocate Russellian
pansychism, which states that consciousness is fundamental, and constitutes the intrinsic nature
of physical matter (Tononi & Koch 2015: p11). In other places, they advocate physicalism by
postulating an identity between consciousness and patterns of integrated information (Tononi
& Koch 2015: p9). However, IIT is in tension with both philosophical theories. It is argued,
quite persuasively, that IIT is logically inconsistent with Russellian panpsychism in (Mørch,
forthcoming).10 And here, we have argued that the conjunction of IIT and physicalism is at the
very least incomplete.11 So let’s try something else.
4 From the hard problem to the illusion problem
There is a philosophy of mind which tries to side-step the hard problem entirely by denying that
phenomenal consciousness exists. Recently, this position received a powerful defence by Frankish
(2016a, 2016b), who refers to the idea as illusionism.12
Illusionism denies that experiences have phenomenal properties. Here ‘experience’ is defined
functionally, as a mental state that is the direct output of sensory systems. The key claim of
10Russellian panpsychism requires that consciousness is a fundamental property of nature. Barrett & Seth
(2011), Peressini (2013: sec. 2.1), and Barrett (2014) all offer arguments against the claim that integrated
information could be, or could be exactly correlated with, a fundamental property. I discuss these in section 6.
11Mindt (2017) also argues that the conjunction of physicalism and IIT yields an incomplete theory. He argues
that IIT only specifies structure and dynamics and that specifying only structure and dynamics is insufficient to
explain consciousness.
12Dennett (1988, 1991) pioneered a similar position, which is often referred to as eliminativism. According to
Dennett (2016: 65), among philosophical theories of consciousness, “illusionism as articulated by Frankish should
be considered the front runner”.
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illusionism is that experiences have quasi-phenomenal properties. A quasi-phenomenal property
is a non-phenomenal, physical property of experience that introspection typically misrepresents
as phenomenal. In other words, introspection represents quasi-phenomenal properties as if there
is something it is like to have them, when in fact there is not.
Frankish does not offer much in the way of an account of introspection, except to say that
introspection issues in dispositions to make phenomenal judgments (judgments about the phe-
nomenal character of particular experiences and about phenomenal consciousness in general),
either directly or by generating intermediate representations of sensory states which ground our
phenomenal judgments (2016a: p14). According to Beaton (2009: p7), introspection is identical
to the ability to gain knowledge in a fundamentally first-person way; even if the relevant knowl-
edge is not gained entirely through introspection (in this sense) it must be gained in a way which
essentially involves introspection. Beaton (2009: p15) adds that on essentially any theory of
introspection, we can introspect “propositional attitude-style states”, including “seeing x” and
“experiencing x”, where x is some possible public state of affairs. For example, introspection is
what allows the right kind of subject to know that she is a seeing a red ball when she is seeing a
red ball.13 Introspection may generate the belief that there is something it is like to see the red
ball, such that this something is physically inexplicable. According to illusionism, this would be
an introspective illusion.
If illusionism is true, there is no hard problem of consciousness. Instead, there is the illu-
sion problem. The illusion problem is the problem of explaining why experiences seem to have
phenomenal properties (when they in fact don’t). Frankish (2016a: pp.27-29) offers several ar-
guments in favour of illusionism. But the main argument seems to be that the illusion problem
is in principle solvable whereas the hard problem is not. For illusionism is not forced to explain
how physical processes give rise to phenomenal consciousness. Instead, it need only explain how
physical systems like us misrepresent themselves as having phenomenal properties. Arguably,
this looks more tractable. Indeed in section 7 I will argue that it is an instance of an “easy”
problem of consciousness since it only involves the mechanistic explanation of cognitive functions.
It is also arguable that when we focus on illusionism, we can better unify our theories of
consciousness with the rest of science. For example Humphrey (2011) connects illusionism with
evolutionary theory. We may be able to better integrate consciousness science with evolutionary
psychology if we start thinking of evolutionary explanations for why we have quasi-phenomenal
properties. Perhaps it was highly adaptive to represent your brain states as having apparently
non-physical properties. Perhaps this helped to give our ancestor’s lives meanings, thereby
motivating them into more advanced activities.
To illustrate how illusionism removes the hard problem, it is instructive to consider what
illusionism says about the conceivability of zombies. A zombie is defined as an exact physical
duplicate of oneself that is not phenomenally conscious. Illusionism trivializes the conceivability
of zombies: we are zombies and we can conceive of ourselves therefore, zombies are conceivable.
Given the way that zombies are often characterized, it might sound outrageous to say that we
are zombies. For sometimes zombies are said to have no subjectivity, and no internal inner life
such that there is nothing it is like to be them and they are “all dark” inside (Chalmers, 1996:
pp.95-6). But given illusionism, this is a misleading description of zombies. For a physical du-
plicate of oneself will have quasi-phenomenal properties that are introspectively misrepresented,
and these misrepresentations will cause the duplicate to assert that it is phenomenally conscious.
So there is at least a sense in which zombies are dramatically distinct from inanimate objects. To
help capture this difference, Frankish (2016a: 23) suggests that we disambiguate a second notion
of “what it is like”, where we can say that there is something it is like to be in a state if that
13The difficulties in making introspection more precise are notorious (see e.g. Prinz (2004) and Schwitzgebel
(2016)). But this is a reasonable starting point.
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state is introspectively (mis)represented as having phenomenal properties. Given the importance
of “what it is like” talk in human story-telling, among other things, this disambiguation seems
essential.
Given illusionism, there is no need to physically explain phenomenal properties, and so there
is no hard problem. However, there is a need to physically explain quasi-phenomenal properties.
This is the illusion problem and it is undeniably formidable. Frankish (2016a: pp.29-37) notes
that a number of challenges must be overcome if we are to solve the illusion problem. Here I wish
to focus on one particularly difficult aspect of the illusion problem, which Frankish (2016a: p35)
attributes to Levine (2001: pp.146–7), and calls the problem of representing phenomenality :
“If there are no phenomenal properties, how do we represent them? How do we
acquire phenomenal concepts and how do these concepts capture the richness of
phenomenality? These are central questions for illusionists, and answering them
would go a long way towards solving the illusion problem.”
To elaborate, even if a concept fails to pick out anything in the world, it is bound to have
some content that can be found in the world. If it didn’t, it would be difficult to see how we
could have acquired the concept in the first place. As a simple example, our concept witch has
been found to not refer to anything. But the concept is made up of parts such that some of those
parts do correspond to things we find in reality, concepts such as woman, broomstick, pointy hat,
etc. Acquisition of the concept can then be explained in terms of confused thinking that wrongly
pulled these (and other) concepts together. The same occurs in more serious scientific examples.
The concept aether refers to material that fills the region of the universe above the terrestrial
sphere and which explains the traveling of light and gravity. Nothing in reality corresponds to
this concept. But plenty corresponds to the concepts used to define aether, such as light and
gravity. Acquisition of the concept can then be explained in terms of confused thinking about
the causes of the behaviour of light and gravity. The problem with phenomenal concepts is that
the entire category of being to which they refer seems not to exist. How, then, could we have
possibly acquired them?
Towards a solution, Frankish offers some “preliminary” remarks, which are intended to “indi-
cate some lines open to the illusionist.” Frankish devotes most of this discussion to the idea that
phenomenal concepts are hybrid concepts. Some concepts are theoretical concepts, they apply
to something defined in terms of potentially false theories (as with aether). Other concepts are
purely recognitional, they apply to something on the basis of recognition. Simple colour concepts
might be examples of recognitional concepts: I apply red to a surface not because my theory tells
me that the surface is red, but because the surface disposes me to call it red. A hybrid concept
is both theoretical and recognitional. Frankish’s idea is that some complex physical property is
recognised by introspection as being “that type of phenomenal property”, where “phenomenal
property” is the theoretical component that treats the complex property as intrinsic, immediately
known, non-physical, etc.
I think the hybrid concept idea is a good start. But much more needs to be said about what
the relevant complex physical properties are, how they could be recognized by introspection,
and what it means for phenomenal concepts to represent those properties as phenomenal. If we
could at least specify the complex physical properties that phenomenal concepts apply to, then
we would progress for at least two reasons. Firstly, this would help specify the veridical aspects
of phenomenal concepts. From there, we might be able to explain the acquisition of phenomenal
concepts in terms of some sort of confused thinking about the veridical aspects of their content.
Secondly, this would help give us the neurophysiological states that introspection acts upon,
thereby enabling further progress in the scientific study of introspection.
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In what follows I will define a theory - illusionist-IIT - which specifies a natural way of
combining IIT and illusionism: the veridical content of hybrid phenomenal concepts is integrated
information. I then show how illusionist-IIT can help resolve outstanding problems for IIT
(section 6). I will then try to make progress on the illusion problem.
5 Illusionist Integrated Information Theory
On the face of it, illusionism and IIT are incompatible. This isn’t just because IIT is formulated as
a theory of something whose very existence is denied by illusionism. It is also because the general
approaches are so different: whereas illusionism proceeds by treating introspection as defective,
IIT proceeds by treating introspection as sacrosanct and providing the primary evidence for the
theory. However, these approaches are not mandatory.
In the case of IIT, it is rather implausible that the primary evidence for IIT is purely phe-
nomenological, whereas the third-person evidence is secondary. More plausibly, third-person
evidence (e.g. cerebrum/cerebellum comparison) that support the idea of a complexity measure
of consciousness comes first. Then, phenomenological considerations (the axioms) simply help
to refine the complexity measure, and to justify why it should measure something like integrated
information in particular. Finally, further third-person tests, e.g. the earlier mentioned experi-
ments that predict subject’s experiences based on their integrated information patterns, complete
the empirical justification of IIT. Looking at the justification of IIT in this way enables us to
lighten the heavy epistemic burden that Tononi and others have placed on introspection. And
in the case of illusionism, it is sufficient if only certain components of phenomenal concepts are
non-veridical. This allows that some components (those suggestive of integrated information)
are partially veridical.
Let us then reformulate the axioms. They can no longer be axioms about phenomenal con-
sciousness (which does not exist, according to illusionism). Instead, they should be axioms about
quasi-phenomenal properties, and how they are introspectively represented. First we need a new
axiom, the illusion axiom, that asserts the existence of quasi-phenomenal properties. Here are
the revised axioms:
Illusion Axiom: experiences have quasi-phenomenal properties, where a quasi-
phenomenal property is a non-phenomenal property of experience that introspection
typically misrepresents as phenomenal.
Intrinsic Existence Axiom: quasi-phenomenal properties are introspectively rep-
resented as being intrinsic properties that are private and immediately known.
Composition Axiom: quasi-phenomenal properties are introspectively represented
as being composed of many phenomenological distinctions.
Information Axiom: quasi-phenomenal properties are introspectively represented
in terms of informative phenomenological differences. That is, each experience ap-
pears to be the particular way it is by differentiating itself from what it is not.
Integration Axiom: quasi-phenomenal properties are introspectively represented
as being unified in the sense that each experience is irreducible to non-interdependent
subsets of phenomenological distinctions.
Exclusion Axiom: quasi-phenomenal properties are introspectively represented as
being definite in content and spatio-temporal grain.
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Given these axioms we can now try to specify what properties a physical system must have
in order to support quasi-phenomenal properties. Let us begin with the postulate that explains
the illusion axiom:
Illusion Postulate: to support quasi-phenomenal properties, a system must have
the type of physical property that is systematically introspectively misrepresented as
being phenomenal.
If we take the strict illusionist stance that phenomenal concepts are entirely non-veridical,
then it would seem that this postulate is all we can get from the axioms. For the postulates should
be about the physical structure of quasi-phenomenal properties (the represented system). But
if the representations specified in the axioms all misrepresent the structure of quasi-phenomenal
properties, then the real postulates need look nothing like the axioms.
However, I have argued that it is difficult to understand phenomenal concepts if they are
entirely non-veridical. In light of this, the best way to proceed is to assume as much as possible
that the representations specified in the axioms accurately represent quasi-phenomenal proper-
ties. If the resulting postulates specify empirically plausible physical correlates of consciousness,
then we were right to treat the axioms veridically. However, if they do not, then we can blame
that on the axioms specifying nonveridical representations, and revise the postulates accordingly.
This seems like a more cautious and more scientific approach than insisting on axioms that spec-
ify “self-evident truths about consciousness – the only truths that, with Descartes, cannot be
doubted and do not need proof” (Oizumi et. al. 2014: 2). It is also a promising method for
isolating the accurate content of phenomenal concepts (if any), to help solve the problem of
representing phenomenality.
As discussed in section 2, there are reasons to think that IIT specifies empirically plausible
physical correlates of consciousness. In that case, let’s take all the axioms at face value, and
adopt all five of the IIT postulates. Of course, the new postulates cannot specify properties
that a system must have for that system to support phenomenal consciousness. Instead, they
must be formulated as specifying properties that a system must have for that system to support
quasi-phenomenal properties. The postulates then become:
Intrinsic Existence Postulate: to support quasi-phenomenal properties, the sys-
tem must have intrinsic causal power. This means having causal power over itself,
independently of external factors.
Composition Postulate: to support quasi-phenomenal properties, the system must
be structured into parts that themselves have causal power within the system.
Information Postulate: to support quasi-phenomenal properties, the system must
specify a causal structure that differentiates its state at one time from its state at
other times. That is, it must contain information about itself.
Integration Postulate: to support quasi-phenomenal properties, the system must
be unified, or irreducible to a simple sum of component causal structures. That is,
the self-information it contains must be integrated.
Exclusion Postulate: to support quasi-phenomenal properties, the system’s causal
structure must be specified over a single set of elements, the set that yields the
maxmimum amount of integrated information.
Let us now put illusionist-IIT to work.
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6 Problem solving with Illusionist-IIT
I have so far identified five problems for IIT: (i) axiom unclarity; (ii) axiom inaccuracy; (iii)
axiom insufficiency; (iv) axiom-postulate disparity; and (v) conscious logic gates. In this section
I will elaborate on each and argue that illusionist-IIT makes progress on solving them. I will
also consider how illusionist-IIT removes some additional technical problems that concern the
formal definition of integrated information (vi). Finally, I consider (vii) the hard problem of
consciousness.
(i) Axiom unclarity : the content of some IIT axioms are unclear. For example, the intrinsic
existence axiom typically contains a metaphysical claim and an epistemic claim (Tononi and
Koch, 2015: p5; Tononi et. al. 2016: p451). The metaphysical claim is that phenomenal
properties are metaphysically intrinsic. The metaphysical claim is unclear as there are recent
challenges to the very concept of metaphysical intrinsicness (McQueen and van Woudenberg,
2016). Illusionist-IIT removes this unclarity since quasi-phenomenal properties are only defined
as being represented as intrinsic. This could be a misrepresentation that involves defective
concepts. If it is, then while IIT’s intrinsic existence axiom would be false, Illusionist-IIT’s
still holds and helps to specify the representational content of phenomenal concepts. This may
force us to revise the corresponding postulate. But since the postulate translates metaphysical
intrinsicness into internal causal power (a less controversial concept), this is not necessary.14
(ii) Axiom inaccuracy : IIT’s intrinsic existence axiom also specifies an epistemic claim: phe-
nomenal properties are private and known with immediate certainty. It is not clear that this
is accurate. It is not a priori since it is conceivable that the best explanation of introspection
involves denying its reliability (See e.g. Dennett (1988, 1991) and Beaton 2009)). Moreover, in-
trospection is routinely found to create illusions. Subjects systematically judge that their visual
field is only blurry at the outer fringes, until they are asked to focus their vision on a point in
front of them, slowly bring a playing card towards that focal point, and say what card it is before
it reaches the focal point (Westerhoff, 2010: p20). The IIT axioms are also just introspective
judgments that are corrigible in light of the unreliability of introspection. Illusionist-IIT resolves
this by removing any mention of epistemic certainty from the axioms.
(iii) Axiom insufficiency : IIT specifies five putative facts about phenomenal consciousness,
but gives no proof that these are the only relevant facts to be considered. The axioms may
therefore specify necessary but not sufficient conditions for consciousness. This seems especially
plausible when we reflect on what IIT implies for certain simple systems such as the AB-system
((a) Figure 1 ). It is reasonable to suppose that any theory that renders AB conscious is yet to
specify sufficient conditions for consciousness. Illusionist-IIT removes this problem by moving the
focus from phenomenal properties to quasi-phenomenal properties. The Illusion axiom states that
quasi-phenomenal properties are typically misrepresented by introspection. In that case, we no
longer have counterintuitive predictions: although the AB-system has the kind of property that is
typically misrepresented by introspection, the AB-system is not actually capable of introspection.
Hence, there is no sense in which there is something it is like to be the AB-system. On the
illusionist’s deflationary notion of “what it is like”, a system must be capable of introspection if
there is going to be something it is like to be that system.
(iv) Axiom-postulate disparity : some IIT postulates appear to only vaguely resemble their
corresponding axioms. For example compare the information postulate with the information
axiom. The axiom states that experiences are partly characterized in terms of their differences:
14To add to the problem of unclarity, some presentations of IIT’s intrinsic existence axiom skip the metaphysical
component entirely, and only include the epistemic component e.g. Oizumi, Albantakis, & Tononi (2014: p2).
This also exacerbates the axiom-postulate disparity problem since the epistemic component seems unrelated to
IIT’s intrinsic existence postulate.
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pain is what it is partly in virtue of not being pleasure, a red experience is what it is partly in
virtue of not being green or blue. There is therefore a sense in which an experience can contain
information by ruling out possibilities. But these possibilities are synchronic: the experience
yields information about the present by ruling out other states as not being present. But the
possibilities specified in the information postulate are diachronic: the physical state yields in-
formation about the future (or past) by ruling out possible future (or past) states. So, it is
unclear why the information postulate supports the information axiom since they concern quite
distinct modal constraints. Illusionist-IIT avoids this problem by allowing that the representa-
tions specified in its axioms are only approximately correct. For example, introspection is right
to a represent a modal constraint, but gets the exact kind of constraint wrong.
(v) The logic gate problem: IIT entails that a 2D grid of around one billion squared identical
XOR gates would have as much Φ and therefore as much consciousness as a human. Illusionist-
IIT entails that nothing is phenomenally conscious and so trivially entails that the grid is not
phenomenally conscious. More importantly, the quasi-phenomenal properties of the grids are
not introspectively represented. The grids were designed only to maximize Φ. They have not,
in addition, been designed to support a complex introspective mechanism. Thus, while there
is something it is like to be us (in the previously defined sense that we undergo introspective
illusions) there is nothing it is like to be the grid (in any relevant sense).
(vi) Technical problems: As mentioned above (note 10), Tononi treats consciousness as a
fundamental property. Integrated information therefore is, or at least perfectly correlates with,
a fundamental property. However, several authors have argued that integrated information
is not up to this task. Thus, Barrett and Seth (2011) offer what they take to be improved
measures of integrated information. However, their measures are not invariant under changes
in coordinates (p14) whereas fundamental properties are usually required to be invariant under
such changes. Peressini (2013: sec. 2.1) argues that for some systems there may be no unique
decomposition of a system into subsystems, meaning there is no unique minimum information
partition to define a unique value for φ. In addition, there may be no unique way of stating
the causal relationships between its subsystems, meaning there is no unique way to define a
system’s information. Finally, Barrett (2014) argues that existing formulations of IIT are not
applicable to standard models of fundamental physical entities since standard models describe
such entities in terms of continuous fields. In rejecting the idea that consciousness is fundamental,
illusionist-IIT evades these objections. In particular, integrated information may be conceived as
a non-fundamental, frame variant, sometimes non-uniquely defined property of discrete systems.
What’s important is that integrated information has certain higher-level causal powers that
make it prone to being misrepresented by introspection. Thus, illusionist-IIT predicts that
introspection is causally sensitive to integrated information among neurons and groups of neural
mechanisms. Introspection need not be sensitive to integrated information that obtains at the
level of elementary particles or continuous fields.
(vii) The hard problem: the hard problem is the problem of physically explaining the existence
of phenomenal consciousness. This problem is removed if phenomenal consciousness does not
exist. By taking the illusionist stance, we replace the hard problem with the illusion problem: the
problem of explaining how introspection systematically misrepresents experiences as phenomenal.
The illusion problem is multi-faceted and remains unresolved. In the next section I argue that
illusionist-IIT makes progress on some aspects of the problem.
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7 Towards a solution to the illusion problem
If there is an empirical case for integrated information being the physical correlate of phenomenal
consciousness, then there is a corresponding puzzle for illusionism: if phenomenal consciousness
does not exist, why does it appear to have a stable physical correlate in the brain? Illusionist-IIT
answers this question by developing an account of introspection according to which introspection
monitors large-Φ states and creates representations of them - phenomenal concepts - whose
non-veridical content causes us to believe in phenomenal consciousness.
One might object that any materialist theory that postulates some physical correlate of
consciousness could be rephrased in terms of illusionism. This would involve stating that the
proposed correlate is simply introspectively misrepresented as being phenomenal. Illusionist-IIT
is distinctive since it helps to solve several problems that plague IIT, as argued in the previous
section. But can illusionist-IIT also solve problems that plague illusionism? In particular, can it
make progress on the illusion problem?
Solving the illusion problem will require more than just philosophical analysis, it will require
significant empirical research too. As Marinsek and Gazzaniga (2016) emphasize in their re-
sponse to Frankish, “a major limitation of illusionism is that it does not offer any mechanisms
for how the illusion of phenomenal feelings works”. One can speculate about various possible
mechanisms, but ultimately we would like such proposals to be experimentally testable. To-
wards a solution, Chalmers (2018) argues that we can create computational models that build
in versions of proposed mechanisms, and we can see whether these models reproduce something
along the lines of human phenomenal reports, and he points to some preliminary research of
this kind in Muehlhauser (2017). Chalmers goes on to argue that by using principled underlying
mechanisms, we can attempt to build increasingly sophisticated systems that exhibit human-like
phenomenal reports with increasing scope and accuracy. If it is possible to build a reasonably
accurate system of this sort, the mechanisms it uses may provide a solution. The key word here
is “principled”.
In the remainder of the paper I suggest that illusionist-IIT is a framework for directing em-
pirical research towards principled mechanisms. I return to the aspect of the illusion problem
discussed in section 4, the problem representing phenomenality. I break this problem down into
three more specific problems and show how illusionist-IIT creates research avenues for solving
them. Three central questions that illusionists must answer are: (i) what exactly are the concep-
tual components of phenomenal concepts? (ii) why do we use such concepts rather than other
representations? (iii) How can we explain the strength of the introspective illusion?
(i) What are the conceptual components of phenomenal concepts? Sections 4 and 5 offered
a partial answer to this question. Recall that when a concept fails to pick out anything in the
world, it will typically have at least some content that can be found in the world. This will then
help to explain how we could have acquired the concept in the first place, and why it fails to
refer. For example, the concept phlogiston refers to a fire-like element within combustible bodies
that is released during combustion. Nothing in reality corresponds to this concept. But plenty
corresponds to the component concepts used to define phlogiston, like fire and combustion. The
acquisition of phlogiston can then be explained in terms of confused thinking about the causes
of combustion.
Illusionist-IIT paves the way for this type of explanation for how we acquired phenomenal
concepts. As discussed in section 5, IIT’s consciousness axioms can be viewed as specifying
components of phenomenal concepts (e.g. being integrated). IIT’s postulates then state what
would be required of a physical system if that content were veridical. If those postulates are
empirically found to be satisfied in the brain, then we may conclude that we have discovered
a veridical component of phenomenal concepts. Any axioms of consciousness that we specify,
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that cannot be supported by the kinds of physical systems that correlate with consciousness, can
then be treated as spelling out nonveridical components of phenomenal concepts. For example,
Descartes thought it was essential to consciousness that it be non-extended, or non-spatial. We
might therefore formulate an axiom stating that quasi-phenomenal properties are introspectively
represented as being non-spatial. This would then be a prime candidate for a non-veridical
component of phenomenal concepts.
Discovering axioms that correctly describe the components of phenomenal concepts is difficult.
What happens when we disagree on what the axioms should be? It may well be that the
structure of our phenomenal concepts differ (between individuals and cultures) with respect
to their nonveridical components. This is an empirical question that can be determined by
experimental psychology and experimental philosophy, e.g. by finding how widely shared are
the various kinds of Chalmers’ (2018) problem intuitions. These are intuitions underlying the
belief that consciousness cannot be physically explained. Philosophical analysis will be essential
to determine whether such intuitions reflect components of phenomenal concepts or just central
beliefs about what those concepts refer to. Whatever the ultimate components of phenomenal
concepts turn out to be, the point I wish to make here is that Illusionist-IIT provides empirically
defensible proposals for the veridical components of phenomenal concepts.
(ii) Why do we use such concepts rather than other representations? One way of answering
this question is to consider why it might have been inevitable that we evolve non-veridical rep-
resentations of experiences. First, it would have been useful to evolve internal representations
of experiences, for example, to communicate how things appear to one, how one is feeling, etc.
Secondly, if materialism is true, then those representations represent extraordinarily complex
physical states of the brain. In that case, it is likely that we would have evolved novel introspec-
tive representations that distort what is being represented. This line is developed by Chalmers
(2018: sec. 2). But the question remains as to why we would have evolved one set of novel
representations over another. Here illusionist-IIT requires that the form of the novel representa-
tions is at least constrained by the form of what they represent. In particular, reflection on those
representations enable one to formulate axioms, whose corresponding postulates are in fact part
of what is represented. Such a view may then be supplemented by the more speculative evolu-
tionary considerations of Humphrey (2011), who argues that representing our internal states as
having non-physical properties would have been fitness enhancing, since believing our minds are
nonphysical makes our lives seem more meaningful and worth living.
(iii) How can we explain the strength of the introspective illusion? I will conclude by consider-
ing a potentially testable prediction of illusionist-IIT that relates the strength of the introspective
illusion to φmax.
IIT predicts that the amount of phenomenal consciousness in an experience is proportional
to its φmax. Hence, one way of experimentally testing IIT is by correlating the φmax of brains of
subjects with their judgments about the amount of phenomenal consciousness they experience.
However, this is difficult in practice, not just because measuring the φmax of a human brain is
difficult, but also because the idea of amount of phenomenal consciousness is unclear.
Illusionist-IIT denies phenomenal consciousness and so must make different predictions. Here
is a prediction of illusionist-IIT: the strength of a subject’s introspective illusion is proportional
to the φmax of the introspected state. Hence, one way of experimentally testing illusionist-IIT
is by correlating the φmax of brains of subjects with the strength of their problem intuitions.
This also raises practical concerns, for example, in determining whether a subject’s expressed
intuitions result from theory-neutral phenomenological reflection or from background theories
of consciousness. Either way, it seems that illusionist-IIT is at least in principle experimentally
distinguishable from IIT.
This prediction requires the existence of an introspective mechanism that is sensitive to
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φmax. At this stage one can only speculate as to how this mechanism could work, for we are
currently far from having a noncontroversial mechanistic account of how introspection could be
sensitive to anything. But one thought is that for introspection to be sensitive to φmax, then it
must be sensitive to some activity that comes along with, say, synchronization between remote
neural networks, such as rapidly propagated activity through electrically coupled neurons. In
principle this could be something that we could find in the brain: something that is sensitive to
such phenomena and that in turn causes phenomenal judgments that are more likely to express
problem intuitions.
8 Conclusion
IIT is a promising scientific theory of consciousness. However, it faces a number of problems
concerning its axioms, postulates, and predictions, as well as its inability to address the hard
problem. Illusionism is a promising philosophical theory of consciousness. However, it leaves
behind the problem of explaining how introspection misrepresents states as being phenomenal
when they are in fact not. This is a significant problem since it is hard to see how we could have
acquired concepts that refer to a completely non-existent category of being. Here it has been
argued that progress can be made on both fronts by revising IIT so that it can be appropriately
combined with illusionism, resulting in what I have called illusionist-IIT.
Illusionist-IIT enjoys a number of advantages over IIT. It no longer faces the hard problem
since illusionism replaces the hard problem with the illusion problem. The simplistic systems
that IIT makes absurd predictions are not capable of introspection so do not have internal lives
in the sense that humans do. And finally, the theory’s physical postulates are no longer restricted
by a set of immutable “consciousness axioms”. Instead, the axioms are converted into statements
about how introspected states are (potentially non-veridically) represented.
Illusionist-IIT also helps illusionism make progress on the outstanding illusion problem: the
problem of explaining how introspection misrepresents states as being phenomenal. Illusionist-
IIT provides us with the physical states that introspection represents and gives us a way of
understanding how introspective representations are at least partially veridical. It is then possible
to explain phenomenal concepts in terms of defective thinking about those physical states. This
then suggests new cognitive mechanisms that could be potentially explained neurophysiologically,
rendering the illusion problem an “easy” problem of consciousness.
Whether either IIT or illusionism are on the right track is an open question. But I hope
to have made the case that there is more progress to be made in their combined illusionist-IIT
form.15
15I would like to thank Hedda Hassel Mørch, Keith Hankins, Michael Pace, Michael Robinson, David Chalmers,
and attendees of the Fall 2017 Metaphysics of Consciousness Seminar at Chapman University, for useful feedback
and discussion.
17
References
Balduzzi, D., & Tononi, G. (2009). Qualia: the geometry of integrated information. PLoS
Computational Biology, 5(8), e1000462.
Barrett, A.B. & Seth, A.K. (2011). Practical Measures of Integrated Information for Time-
Series Data. PloS Computational Biology, 7(1), e1001052.
Bayne, T. (2007). Conscious States and Conscious Creatures: Explanation in the Scientific
Study of Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives, 21(1), 1–22.
Bayne, T. (2008). The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome. Journal of
Philosophy, 105(6), 277-300.
Block, N. (2009). Comparing the Major Theories of Consciousness, in Gazzaniga, M. (ed.)
The Cognitive Neurosciences IV. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Brueckner, A. (2001). Chalmers’s conceivability argument for dualism. Analysis 61: 187–93.
Cerullo, M.A. (2015). The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory.
PloS Computational Biology 11(9): e1004286.
Chalmers, D.J. (1995). Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 2(3): 200-219.
Chalmers, D.J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D.J. (2012). Constructing the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D.J. (2018). The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. https://philarchive.org/archive/CHATMO-
32. Accessed: 5/17/2018.
Dennett, D.C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. New York: Little, Brown.
Dennett, D.C. (1996). Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness. Journal of Con-
sciousness Studies, 3:4-6.
Dennett, D.C. (1998). Quining Qualia, in Marcel, A.J. & Bisiach, E. (eds.) Consciousness
in Modern Science, pp.42-77, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, D.C. (2016). Illusionism as the Obvious Default Theory of Consciousness. Journal
of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12): 65-72.
Frankish, K. (2016a). Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 23(11-12): 11-39.
Frankish, K. (2016b). Not Disillusioned: Reply to Commentators. Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 23(11-12): 256-289.
18
Haun, A., Kawasaki, H., Kovach, C., Oya, H., Howard, M. A., Adolphs, R., & Tsuchiya,
N. (2016). Contents of Consciousness Investigated as Integrated Information in Direct Human
Brain Recordings. bioRxiv. doi:10.1101/039032.
Humphrey, N. (2011). Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Levine, J. (2001). Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Marinsek, N.L. & Gazzaniga, M.S., (2016). A Split-Brain Perspective on Illusionism. Journal
of Consciousness Studies, (23)11-12: 149-159.
McQueen, K.J. (2015). Mass Additivity and A Priori Entailment. Synthese, 192(5):1373-
1392.
McQueen, K.J. & van Woudenberg, R. (2016). Tests for Intrinsicness Tested. Philosophical
Studies, 173: 2935-2950.
Mindt, G. (2017). The Problem with the ‘Information’ in Integrated Information Theory.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24(7-8): 130-54.
Mørch, H.H. (forthcoming). Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compat-
ible with Russellian Panpsychism? Erkenntnis.
Muehlhauser, L. (2017). A Software Agent Illustrating Some Features of an Illusionist
Account of Consciousness. OpenPhilanthropy. [https://www.openphilanthropy.org/software-
agentillustrating-some-features-illusionist-account-consciousness]
Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014). From the Phenomenology to the Mecha-
nisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0. PLos Computational Biology, 10(5),
e1004654.
Peressini, A. F. (2013). Consciousness as Integrated Information: A Provisional Philosophi-
cal Critique. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20(1): 180-206.
Prinz, J.J. (2004). The Fractionation of Introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies,
11(7–8): 40–57.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it Like to be a Bat? The Philosophical Review. 83(4), 435-450.
Schickore, Jutta. (2014). Scientific Discovery. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
(Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/scientific-
discovery/.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. (2016). Introspection. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Winter
2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/introspection/.
19
Stoljar, D. (2005). Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts. Mind and Language, 20: 469-94.
Tegmark M (2016). Improved Measures of Integrated Information. arXiv:1601.02626.
Tononi, G. (2004). An Information Integration Theory of Consciousness. BMC Neuroscience,
5(42).
Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as Integrated Information: A Provisional Manifesto. The
Biological Bulletin, 215(3), 216-242.
Tononi, G. (2014). Why Scott should stare at a blank wall and reconsider (or, the conscious
grid). https://www.scottaaronson.com/tononi.docx. Accessed January 6 2018.
Tononi, G., & Koch, C. (2015). Consciousness: Here, There, and Everywhere? Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences, 370(1668).
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016). Integrated Information Theory:
From Consciousness to its Physical Substrate. Nature Reviews, Neuroscience, 17(7), 450-461.
Tsuchyia, N. (2017). “What is it Like to be a Bat?” - a Pathway to the Answer from the
Integrated Information Theory. Philosophy Compass, 12:e12407.
Tsuchiya, N., Haun, A., Cohen, D., & Oizumi, M. (2017). Empirical Tests of Integrated
Information Theory of Consciousness. In A. Hagg (Ed.), Return of Consciousness. Axon Foun-
dation: Sweden.
van Gulick, R. (1999). Conceiving beyond our means: The limits of thought experiments. In
(S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & D. Chalmers, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT
Press.
Westerhoff J. (2010). Twelve Examples of Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Worley, S. (2003). Conceivability, possibility and physicalism. Analysis 63:15-23.
20
